HP 3000 SECURITY/RISK MANAGEMENT

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HP 3000 Security/risk management

Purpose

The purpose of security/risk management is to maintain operations in planned mode to prevent as far as practicable unauthorized access to (discovery or modification) of program and data files to prevent, mitigate or recover from inside or outside dysfunctions. Environment Organizations that can afford an HP 3000 and the support staff generally are significant businesses. Edp costs vary between 1.5 pct and 5 pct of total costs and

business related systems may handle 30 pct to 50 pct of company revenues.

The following system illustrate the point.

Payroll	30	pct	plus				
materials purchasing	30						
accounts payable	30	н	н				
materials inventory	10		11				
general ledger	100	"	п				
Hence a 20 Dollar a year	bus	ines	s may	run 6	5 to 2	0	
million through its HP 30	000						
my company runs approxim	nate	ly 7	0 mil	lion 1	throug	h and	
we may double that in 12	mon	ths.					
Most HP 3000 installation	ns r	epre	sent a	a depa	artmen	t's	
first or most ambitious s	step	int	o el	ectro	nic da	ta	
processing away from man	ua 1	or s	ervic	e cen	ter op	eratio	ns.
a large portion of system	n ma	nage	rs ha	ve ha	d litt	le or i	no system
management responsibilit	ies.						
This presentation is aim	ed a	t th	em an	d the	ir con	cerned	
auditors.							
2 - 1							
2. The fundamental secur	ity	devi	sion	rule			
to determine the second by a			chou	ld bo	hacod	I on co	c t

decision about security measures should be based on cost versus worth. An organization shouldn't spend more to avoid an increase than the libel or expected cost of the incident. In mathematical terms de(pic1) is greater than(de(p1'ci') plus demci)

where

de equals discounted expected value

pi " probability of incident i

c1 " " cost of incident i

mci " cost of mitigation measures for incident i No absolutes

The cedision rule is not a new or original concept. It is a game theory rule that emphasizes that there are no absolutes. That measures short of suicide can't eliminate undesired incidents: they can only reduce theire probability on their cost.

Consider a fire in the computer room. It can be caused by a dropped cigarette or an electrical short or an overheated cooling fan or arson or a fire in the next room or one probagated through the plenum or false floor. Rules can ban smoking but not electrical shorts.

2 - 3

Paperless computer rooms can reduce the source of fuel and halon systems can reduce the source of oxygen. But how often is the computer room the first source of fire in a building. How many computer rooms share buildings with chemical closets used by cleaning personnel or oily rags used by engineers?

How many computer centers are built on bed rock with fire proof walls and no common air conditioning equipment?

How well will these fire retardent measures combate and enternally sourced fire and which more probable? 2 - 4

The probability of a computer room fire is very low on the order less than 0.1 pct per year. The cost of an automatic halon system is 4000 to 10,000 for a 10' x 15' room. It would imply that the cost of the fire totally suppressed should be

4000/.001

or

4,000,000

if back-up tapes are stored off-site and there is a back-up computer access agreement, then it is unlikely that the cost of a total hardware loss fire would equal 4,000,000. It follows that an expensive automatic halon system may be a waste of stockholders' money for a business data processing machine. This of course may not be true for a real time process control computer or an airline reservation system. This is a reasonable example of applying the

decision rule. It of course doesn't leave the auditors with a sanguine feeling, that I placated by installing a 60 handcarried halon system.
3. Quantification of security costs
Decisions about security need to be couched in reasonable estimates of costs of security systems and probabilities of undesired incidents.
3.1 Security systems costs.
Security systems can be divided into two arbitrary classes
probability reducers

cost mitigators

The following are examples of

probability reducers, their objectives

and ball park costs.

item	objective	cost range	comment
computer room	reduce unauthor-	150- 1000	cheap looks
locks	ized access		can be
			jimmied
			with credit
			card
door locks	reduce unauthor-	100- 300	beveled
	ized access to	one time	latches can
	files		be jimmied
	reduce probabil-		with credit
	ity of theft		card
			- 3 - S2 4

- 2 -

							same port.
item	objective	cost range	comment	no smoking	reduce fire	1 to?	some smokers
sentries	reduce unauthor-	10,000- 20,000	cheap		probability		will violate
	ized access to	per shift per	sentry can		reduce disk wear		rule. Some
	files	year	become thief				may quit.
	reduced probabil-		can become	manual fire pu	t out fire	50- 200	Good for
	ity of thef		lazy	evtinguisher	•••••		limited fire.
passwords	reduce unauthor-	1.00- 5.00	effective-	extiliguisher			Deesn't work
account, group,	ized access to	per password	ness is in-				without
user	files and	per change	versely pro-				operator.
	programs		portioned to	tone healt up	nacovan last	15 to 50	Typically
			age and	tape back-up	filos	ner tane ner	half a week
			number of	system	THES	day nlus re-	day will be
			cognocenti			any plusic	lost and will
			approaching			1/2 a day per	have manual-
itom	objective	cost range	comment			1/2 a day per	ly ro-ontered
reem			zero after			person	hack-up tapos
			three days.				back-up capes
			Low cost and	item	objective	cost range	Comment Chauld he
			low effect-				Should be
			iveness				stored
			paswords are				remotely. Need
			stored in				protection
			clear text				system.
			in stream	remote	protect back-up	2- 10 per	Should be
			iobs that	tape	tapes from	month per	tested
			are not	storage	local dys-	tape	episodically
			lock worded		function		
			and in image	hardware	recover costs	2 to 5 pct of most	large companies
			and in image	insurance	of	hardware	self-insured.
			schema that		disaster	1.5 to 3	Read policies
			are not lock			times costs	carefully.
			worded.			the expected	
			Multi user			cost of the	
			paswords			disaster	
			obviate	Internal			
			accountabil-	violatio	n of privacy		
			ity	wanipula	tions		
item	objective	cost range	e comment manipulatio		oct vondors and employees		
terminal	keep unauthorized	50- 400	can be by-	that a badyon information			
locks	users from		passed with	thert or	nardware, information		
	accessing system		second				
			terminal re-				-
			connected to				- 5 -
			- ⁴ - S2 5				S2 6

External

fires

earthquakes

bombings

power failures

toxic spills

phone system failures

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92.1

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